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Democracy as Failure
(Forthcoming in Nomos, Vol. 60, 2020)
Aziz Z. Huq*
“I can't go on. I'll go on.”
Samuel Beckett, The Unnamable (1953)
The theory and the practice of democracy alike are entangled with the prospect of
failure. This is so in the sense that a failure of one kind or another is almost always to be found
at democracy’s inception. Further, different kinds of shortfalls dog its implementation. No
escape is found in theory, which precipitates internal contradictions that can only be resolved
by compromising important democratic values. Out of localized failure, indeed, comes
wholesale breakdown. A stable democratic equilibrium proves elusive because of the tendency
of discrete lapses to catalyze wider, systemically disruption. Worse, the very pervasiveness of
local failure also obscures the tipping point at which systemic change occurs. Social
coordination in defense of democracy is therefore very difficult, and its failure correspondingly
more likely.
This thicket of intimate entanglements has implications for both the proper
description and normative analysis of democracy. At a minimum, the nexus of democracy and
failure elucidates the difficulty of dichotomizing democracies into the healthy and the ailing.
It illuminates the sound design of democratic institutions by gesturing toward resources
usefully deployed to mitigate the costs of inevitable failure. Finally, it casts light on the public
psychology best adapted to persisting democracy. These epistemic, psychological, and
institutional projects have not been identified, or extensively discussed, in recent political
philosophy. That latter tends to focus on social choice questions, deliberative democracy, or
accommodations with Rawlsian political liberalism.1 But to grasp the proximity of democracy’s
entanglements with failure is to temper the aspiration for popular self-government as a steadystate equilibrium, to open new questions about the appropriate political psychology for a
sound democracy, and to limn new questions about democracy’s optimal institutional
specification. It is, for these reason, a worthwhile enterprise for political philosophy.
In developing these claims, I use the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘failure’ in the following
capacious senses. By failure, I mean simply a falling short of an aspiration or goal that is
inherent in a specific enterprise. Consider, by way of example, what it means to fail as a parent.
I also fail if I expose my child to avoidable, yet disabling injury. I also fail her, though, if I
needlessly lose my temper at her trivial mischief. This second sort of failure is not in isolation
fatal, but can have grave effects over time. This is a capacious understanding of failure: It takes
as a counter-factual an idealized well-functioning and inclusive democracy, one that enfolds
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the best of the manifold flawed polities we can observe in the world. I adopt this definition in
part because of the possibility that small dysfunctions can, over time, aggregate to systemic
threats. Hence, in the parenting context, a broken leg may heal, but the cumulative effect of
my repeated failures to maintain my composure may, in the fullness of time, inflict great harm
on my daughter’s psyche and well-being. Big things, that is, can have small beginnings.
I define a democracy for present purposes as a set of institutions through which all the
adult citizenry of a nation routinely and effectively shapes how political power is exercised.2
Although relatively thin, this definition still embodies a certain number of normative
commitments: It entails a certain kind of inclusion of all the polity; a linkage between that
whole people and political power (i.e., not control by a minority); and a commitment to
maintaining the system of popular control. My definition is, however, mechanistically catholic.
It allows for elections, direct democracy, and sortition. Deliberation is not required.3 And no
one mechanism has a monopoly on the democracy label.4 More important than any procedural
entailment is the system-level possibility of public views materially influencing how state
power is deployed. A litmus test for democracy is hence the presence of substantial
uncertainty, before new leaders or new policies are selected, about who those leaders or what
those policies will be.5 Alternatively, one might ask whether the modal adult citizen has the
possibility of participating in the choice of who exercises political power.6
These institutional preconditions pertain directly to a democracy’s claim to legitimacy
qua democracy. In the absence of uncertainty over elective choice, and in the absence of some
relationship between electors and those elected, there is no plausible argument that a
government has a moral argument for compliance on the ground that it is a democracy.
Although the actual sociological predicates of state legitimacy and legal compliance likely vary
across polities, I think it is fair to say that in observable democratic systems, participants
generally believe, to some degree, that citizens have an obligation of compliance with law, even
some law with which they disagree, simply because they are participants in a democracy.
Moreover, the rule of law necessary to democratic endurance requires officials and judges to
have a specific disposition of respect and acceptance toward the law. Continued electoral
competition requires incumbents to hold a certain attitude of restraint toward their opponents.
Being a member of the loyal opposition remains its own ethics of patience and restraint. Mere
“legalism”—the position that ethical obligations are exhausted by rule-following alone7—is
singular unpropitious as a psychology of democracy. Unlike chess or Go, therefore, democracy
is a game that rests on normative choices and that requires normative commitments from its
participants. The plausibility of these normative demands turns on how well basic democratic
institutions work. Hence, the manner in which democracy’s necessary mechanisms are
vulnerable to failure has implications for the strength of a state’s moral claim to legitimacy,
and perhaps the strength of its sociological legitimacy.
The argument of this article has two strands. One aims to tightly hitch the idea of
democracy—which typically has a positive valence—with the prospect of failure—usually
glossed as negative. Despite incompatible evaluative tilts, I will suggest that democracy cannot
be understood except in light of its likely and certain failures, both theoretical and practical. A
second strand of the argument then links failure writ small to failure writ large.
The thought that democracy itself is a kind of failure is not new. A long tradition of
political thought, starting in Book VIII of Plato’s Republic, condemns democracy as flawed in
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its inception and practice.8 The republican thought of the Florentine republics, as John Pocock
argued, also recognized an especially rich array of “theoretical reasons” for self-government’s
failure.9 One can thus imagine an ‘anatomy of anti-democracy,’ akin to the genealogies of antiliberalism carved by Isaiah Berlin and Stephen Holmes, one that carries Plato’s theme forward
to Hobbes and Schmitt, and thence to anarchists, contemporary libertarians, and critical
theorists.10 That’s not my project here, although the republican intuition that self-government
coexists with its incipient failure chimes with my analysis. Equally, I am not concerned with
limning an alternative to democracy. I accept Churchill’s familiar dictum that democracy is the
least bad option available.11
Further, I concede that ‘democracy’ as an ideal type does not exist. There are only
actual, existing democracies that are congeries of imperfectly formed, variably managed
institutions and political formations. None are as good as they could be, but only some are
fairly denominated as failing. Indeed, it is useful to think about democracy in terms of those
actual, existing institutions as a means to develop from the ground up an understanding of
how democracy is constrained by its own normative and pragmatic commitments. It is a way
of surfacing what a Marxian would call democracy’s ‘internal contradictions,’ the seeds of its
inevitable crises. This inductive approach is different from the posture adopted by other
prominent theorists who offer instead “a model for institutions to mirror.”12 My approach
thus stands in a revived tradition of non-ideal theory, or political realism, although I hope to
avoid having the gravitational pull of brute facts push me into any “uncritical defense” of the
status quo.13 Although not all of tensions I highlight can be avoided, almost all can be managed
to some extent though institutional design, legal checks, or shared normative commitments
among political elites.
Four Species of Democratic Failure
There are four margins along which democracy, in very different senses, fails. Mapping
these four salients, each of which stretches out into a no-man’s land of ambiguously justified
government arrangements, is a way to grasp the complex intimacy of democracy and failure.
Democracy as Failure 1: Democracy’s Violent Midwife
Democracy began among Greek city-states, in the sixth century B.C.E., and was in
rude health until at least the fourth century B.C.E. More than two thousand years later, in the
late eighteenth century, it was taken up on both sides of the Atlantic after monarchy had, in
different ways, been repudiated.14 Only in the late twentieth century did it become globally
hegemonic—not coincidentally as one of the two early Atlantic adopters assumed a mantle of
global stewardship. Both the first and the second historical eras of democracy, therefore,
punctuated a very different status quo with its own entitlements and beneficiaries. The fact of
violence (and what would under other circumstances be denominated a crime), and the
attendant unsettling of an institutional status quo, generates a first set of constraints and
contradictions. These limit democracy and in some measure orient it toward failure.
The origin of Athenian democracy is conventionally located in Cleisthenes’s reforms
of 508-07 B.C.E. Herodotus portrayed these as a ploy to consolidate power against aristocratic
rivals in the wake of a Spartan occupation.15 But democratic reforms were only feasible “in the
aftermath of two oligarchic coups d’états and a devastating military defeat,”16 that is, as one
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equilibrium in a longer series of nonlinear avulsions in governmental form. Without crisis and
defeat, it is not clear Athenian democracy would have emerged. Moreover, Athenians
themselves “chose” to look back on a distinct “founding, authorizing moment”: the public
murder of Hipparchus by Harmodius and Aristogeiten some six years earlier.17 So even if Paul
Cartledge is correct that the murderers did not act on any political passion, and even if the
Peisistratid tyranny with which Hipparchus was associated did not come to an end until Sparta
invaded, it is still quite telling that the self-perception of the world’s first democracy hinged
on the commission of a crime. It was a widely shared recognition that an act of violence was
needed to separate democracy from a prior epoch.18
Two millennia later, both American and the French revolutions also pivoted on violent
acts. In one, the thrum of Jefferson’s distinctive cadences could not hide the bloody and
martial quality of America’s entrance on the world stage.19 In the other, a no-less eloquent
guillotine blade bisected the monarch’s sublunary body, setting in motion both international
and domestic paroxysms.20 Even if revolutionary events were initially set into motion on the
belief that a revised ancien régime could be restored, purged of the despotic tendencies or fiscal
depredations, 21 the fact of violence demarcated two regimes. It thereby raised stakes for
reluctant revolutionaries, closing off doors to retreat or reconciliation. Even seemingly
incrementalist pathways to democracy, such as Britain’s, were entwined with violence. The
enactment of the Great Reform Act of 1832 in the United Kingdom, a landmark of democratic
reform, was prompted by the so-called Swing riots of 1830-31.22 Democratic reform would be
taken up again in 1867 in part largely because of the continued, sometimes violent, militancy
of the Chartist movement, which in turn had emerged from the perceived betrayal of the
working classes in the 1832 legislation.23
The connection between violence and democratic origin is not universal. Not every
democracy’s birth is marked by violence; in other cases, the violence that does occur is not a
repudiation of the former dispensation. Decolonization in South Asia and Africa, for example,
was often characterized by violence directed at other members of a nascent polity rather than
at a former regime. India’s partition is an example of a democratic origin where violence
occurred, but was not aimed at repudiating the former colonial regime. and, indeed, ended up
inscribing religious and regional distinctions that were in some measure a function of the
imperial imagination.
When democracy is demarcated with extralegal violence—as is often, if not inevitably,
the case—it generates distinctive theoretical and practical difficulties. Democracy as a going
concern depends on a stable set of institutions constituted by and operating under law. Shorn
of a commitment to the rule of law, democratic institutions cannot operate in an orderly and
effective fashion. When democracy has violent origins, by contrast, it will have encoded in its
historical DNA the legitimacy of extra-legal appeals against established institutions. The
possibility of ultra vires force in service of a better state hence becomes salient and unavoidably
available as a destabilizing rhetorical move and practical possibility. Violence invites more,
potentially unravelling violence. At the very least, it creates the rhetorical platform to justify
and legitimate a repudiation of the state’s putative monopoly on force.
In the French case, the initial criminal act could not be contained, but spilled over into
iterative violent purges of the body politic. And in the newly independent United States, too,
violence persisted to a degree that embarrasses the dominant, hagiographic historiography of
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the Founding. The roughly one in five former colonists who supported the Crown were
harassed by their neighbors—sometimes tarred and feathered—dispossessed of their lands,
and in some cases formally banished; some 60,000 ultimately left the new nation.24 Aligned,
although nor identical to, violence is the possibility of extra-legal constitutional change. The
first American constitution (the Articles of Confederation) was then unlawfully abandoned for
a second (now canonical) version. “Illegality,” as Bruce Ackerman has written, “was a leitmotif
at the Convention from first to last.”25 That did not breed violence (although it entrenched
and enabled the violence of slavery). But the subsequently success of American democracy,
such as it is, rests on an impressive historical erasure of its own origins. That erasure in turn
might be one cause of the nearly pathological reverence for the Constitution’s drafters today.
The violent origins of democracy, more generally, signal to supporters of the old
regime that their presence in the new polity is at the sufferance of newly enfranchised
majorities. The split marked by extralegal violence can lead to profoundly anti-democratic civil
violence and demographic purges. Democracy established by violence thus in practice
proximately depends often not just on persuasion, but also on violent purgatives, for its
endurance. The same problem, it should not be noted, arises even in the absent of a founding
crime. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several of its former satellite states across
Eastern Europe enacted lustration measures targeting tens of thousands of former state
officials and employees.
Yet at the same time, democracy as a going concern depends on the apolitical rule of
law in which losers are not hounded from home, ordinary lives, or country. A democracy must
be able to manage public disagreements about policy and governmental performance through
a predictable and stable set of institutional arrangements. Democracy won’t persist unless
honest politicians know that they won’t be locked up for imagined offenses†; unless they know
that in opposition they will be able to campaign and criticize; and unless they know that the
subsequent round of elections will not be engineered to ensure a repeat performance of their
defeat.26 That is, they depend on the state’s legitimate monopoly on force. A democracy that
begins in crime has already betrayed its fragile commitment to the rule of law. It has thus
created conditions in which it is more than reasonable for those out of power to legitimately
wonder whether the legal commitments upon which a democracy rests will be kept in
subsequent periods.
Democracy as Failure 2: Democracy as Compromise
Whether constructed on a crime or not, a new democratic order will of practical
necessity be designed to limit the power of duly formulated majorities to achieve what would
otherwise be legitimate policy ends. Constraints on the exercise of democratic choice, which
are often baked into a new constitutional text and enforced by an unelected judiciary, do not
bite on all possible democratic coalitions uniformly. Rather, it is more likely than not that a
democratic constitution—understood either in terms of a formal text or a set of unwritten but
consolidated arrangements such as Britain’s or Israel’s—will constrain asymmetrically some
The adjectival caveat is intentional; dishonest politicians who abuse state power—the South African former
president Jacob Zuma being a useful recent example—should not have any insulation from criminal
prosecution. While the prospect of criminal liability in some instances can motivate a leader’s decision to stay in
power, in my view the more important effect is to incentivize law-breaking while in office.
†

5
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3378117

of those who wanted for political authority under a prior regime. Where those compromises
undermine the essential institutional elements of a democracy, the latter’s plausible claim to
legitimacy starts to corrode.
As I have already noted, democracies are normally fashioned in conditions that do not
favor the sort of ideal constitutional design envisaged by deliberative democracy’s advocates.
Commonly accompanied by violence, the end of an ancien régime will likely be characterized by
political turmoil as new factions jockey for pivotal powers within the new institutional
dispensation. Even if violence against former rulers does not erupt, violence as a byproduct
of contestation over civil power often proves endemic. Civil strife undermines the possibility
that new institutions of state will either be designed through democratic processes or will
instantiate democratic ideals in operation. Not only are the ordinary processes of democracy
consultation and debate hindered. Civil strife also intensifies internal schisms that ordinarily
could be navigated through legislatures, constituent assemblies, and like collective bodies.27
Where bargains are struck, they are as likely to reflect exhaustion as political principle. An
ethics of institutional creation under such conditions is best framed as Hippocratic in quality—
striving, as physicians do, to avoid the creation of any new harms rather than the creation of
the best the best imaginable form of government.28
Even if a democracy is not crafted under conditions of crisis, it is likely to be
circumscribed by endogenous constraints. Incremental processes of democratization through
legislation are often best understood as concessions by powerful groups (such as a monarchy
or a land-holding class) to cede just enough authority in the form of a permanent democratic
institution so as to dissipate the threat of more serious violent uprisings.29 The leading political
economy of this dynamic, offered by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, underscores the
redistributive character of new democratic arrangements. But their formal model does not
imply that incremental democratization will lead to a level playing field. To the contrary, a
subsequent extension of their model suggests that once democratic arrangements are in place,
political elites will renege and use their material resources as a way to capture a
disproportionate share of de jure political power—thus curtailing the inevitable redistributive
implications of a broader franchise.30 Recent empirical work, moreover, suggests that powerful
elites tend to succeed in entrenching their preferences in new constitutional beyond revanchist
democratic tides.31
Under the modal conditions of its creation, therefore, democratic arrangements will
be negotiated with some factions or social groups exercising disproportionate influence as a
consequence of their ability to threaten new civil strife. It has historically tended to be
propertied factions that have this upper hand. This fact has escaped no-one. During the Putney
debates of 1647, Cromwell’s son-in-law Henry Ireton cautioned the Levellers that universal
male suffrage would “come to destroy property thus. You may have such men chosen or at
least the major part of them, as have no local or permanent interest. Why might these men
not vote against all property?” To Ireton, this seemed an obvious and dangerous fallacy since
by definition, the aim of “government is to preserve property.” 32 Many since Ireton have
concurred. James Madison, for example, defined the iniquity of faction in distributional terms.
He warned in Federalist 10 that democracies “have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property.”33 The U.S. Constitution was designed to avoid this
incompatibility, and not necessary to promote a democracy in which, as Sir Thomas
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Rainsborough said at Putney, elective institutions acknowledge that “the poorest he hath a life
to live … as the greatest he.”34
The history of democratic institutional design, accordingly, has been a history of partial
blockages and countermeasures intended to stymie sub silencio the inevitable redistributive
effects of an enlarged franchise. This is just as true when a democratic order emerges through
a series of incremental reforms as when it arises through a single, convulsive change: The
constraints I identify attend efforts at constitutional amendment as much as those aimed at
constitutional creation. 35 A range of measures can achieve this end without evincing any
obvious infidelity to democratic principles. These range from limitations on eligibility for
elected office, voter qualifications, or—Madison’s solution—the use of a large geographic unit
to dilute the power of redistribution-minded majority.36 Indeed, it is striking that the prospect
of asymmetrically constrained democratic power has become so embedded and accepted that
two of its principal instruments—representation and judicial review—have come to be seen
as natural, even inevitable, elements of a well-run democracy.37 As Bernard Manin reminds
us, in the late eighteenth century a “government organized along representative lines was seen
as differing radically from democracy, whereas today it passes for a form thereof.”38 In its
original, parliamentary form—prior to the emergence of mass-based parties—representation
would ensure that only those “who inspired the trust of their constituents as a result of their
local connections, their social prominence, or by the deference their provoked” obtained
elective office. 39 By selecting for social rank, representation would defuse redistributive
sentiment. The depth of democracy’s defeat by the political practicalities of its origin is
nowhere better exemplified than in the bare fact that so many assume that representation is
integral—rather than anathema—to democracy.
The second device commonly used to constrain democracy, and yet often painted as
“representation reinforcement,” is a high court tasked with the resolution of constitutional
questions.40 As described by Ran Hirschl, the role of a judiciary in a new democracy is instead
one of “hegemonic preservation.” This means giving judges the constitutionally defined role
of protecting rights to property, as well as other market-preserving entitlements, as a way to
forestall democratic majorities’ ability to redistribute resources.41 This “insurance” against too
much democracy provides a hard constraint to democratic rule, at the same time as it generates
a patina of legality for a new state.42 The posture of the early U.S. Supreme Court in respect
to slavery, and the Indian Supreme Court in respect to land redistribution provide striking
examples of this thesis.
Particularly in the United States, but also elsewhere, there is a persistent notion that
courts not only should but indeed will be a mechanism for protecting democracy in practice.
This is a serious error. The independence of the judicial power is not correlated to the judicial
commitment to democratic consolidation or expansion. In the United States, the Supreme
Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren is commonly celebrated for decisions on race, electoral
reform, and criminal justice. The Warren Court is taken as proof of the connection between
judicial independence and an expansive, substantive commitment to democratic rule. But the
Warren Court’s role in the American polity is aberrational rather than representative.
For much of American history, the most important effect of judicial review on
democratic norms was the maintenance of racial exclusions via decisions upholding fugitive
slave laws, the right to move slaves across jurisdictional lines, and the legal subordination of
7
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‘free’ blacks in the form of separate but equal. After the Civil War, it enabled the dismantling
of Reconstruction, and embraced only lightly disguised racial circumscription of the
franchise. 43 Until the mid-twentieth century, civil society formations such as unions and
minority religious groups obtained little or no shelter from the courts. The Court today has
declined to limit partisan gerrymandering or rein in dark campaign money, at the same time
that it has embraced racially disproportionate restraints on the franchise, such as voter
identification requirements and election roll purges. As the twenty-first century unfolds, it
seems likely that once again the Court’s approaches to campaign finance, redistricting,
commercial speech, the right to unionize, and the discrimination against disfavored racial
minorities will in the aggregate narrow, rather than expand, democratic space. Outside the
United States, courts have generally fared ill as defenders of electoral choice in the recent wave
of democratic backsliding.44 In short, judicial independence has in practice worked better as a
hedge against property dispossession than democratic dispossession.
There is nothing structural about the manner in which the American Supreme Court
is selected, or the array of canonical textual and precedential sources at its ready disposal, that
conduces to a pro-democracy role. Judges are appointed by dominant political coalitions.
These have an incentive to use appointments as a device to entrench themselves against
electoral competition. The context in which the vast majority of the constitutional text was
first adopted was not properly democratic. And, as noted, the commitment of key drafters to
democratic practice was in fact quite precarious. It should thus be no surprise that the Court
has in the long run done more to damage than to aid democracy.
A different argument to the effect that the structural conditions of democratic origins
impede democracy would start not from the power of domestic interest groups, but would
instead look at the supranational and international institutions such as the (now defunct)
Bretton Woods system, the World Trading Organization, the European Union, and the web
of bilateral and multilateral treaties as a network designed to encase and constrain domestic
(usually democratic) governments’ freedom of policy choice. According to an illuminating
recent history of neoliberal thought, these comprised “an extra-economic enforcer for the
world economy in the twentieth century” that has emerged as wealth’s conventional safeguards
of representation and franchise restrictions have withered in efficacy. 45 More generally,
international competition fosters conditions that thwart certain democratic impulses. Hence,
analysts working in a Marxian tradition observe that the mobility of industrial and financial
capital creates a “reservation profit” that works as a floor below which capital flight occurs.46
Materials indications of the success of democracy-limiting strategies abound. Among
the most important are the persistence of slavery or its functional analogs as a feature of
societies commonly denominated as democratic, and the enduring of various ideological
justifications for the systematic marginalization and subordination of women. Consider the
first of these as an example (although a parallel narrative could be offered about gender-based
exclusions). One estimate suggests that between twenty and thirty person of the Athenian
population in the late fourth century B.C.E. were enslaved.47 Of the eighty-four clauses of the
1787 U.S. Constitution, six directly concern slavery, and another four had substantial
implications for the peculiar institution that were recognized and debated at the Philadelphia
Convention.48 Provisions tying the presence of slavery to the size of a state’s congressional
delegation, and thence to its influence in the Electoral College, shaped the early Republic’s
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politics, ensuring that slaveholders dominated both the antebellum White House and Supreme
Court.49
Until the late twentieth century, moreover, the southeast of the United States subsisted
in a state of “subnational authoritarianism,” in which one-party rule was ensured through the
electoral abnegation of the African-American population. That population, in turn, was again
the lynchpin of a profitable agrarian economy that faltered only with the introduction of
mechanization at the beginning of the twentieth century. A similar point could be made about
the exclusion of women from the franchise until 1919, a measure that reflected widely accepted
social norms of domestic authoritarianism. As in the Athenian case, these facts are strikingly
neglected in conventional talk of American democratic history. The failure in common
parlance to recognize that racial and gender exclusions are fatal to the very label ‘democracy’—
as I think they are—is telling evidence that we—as a society—still fail to take seriously the
experience and interests of excluded groups, primarily African-American, who labored under
the authoritarian hand of Jim Crow. It is an epistemic failure that continues to catch our
common tongue in culpable neglect.
The failures of democracy that flow from the initial demand for compromise, in short,
are a dominant feature of the landscape even in putative paragons of democracy, such as the
United States. A plausible prediction based on the common circumstances of democratic
creation is that democracy’s advent will be typically accompanied by the persistent
subordination and exclusion of subaltern populations. At the same time, devices such as
representation and judicial review will work to curb the most ambitious redistributive within
the demos. To be clear, it is not that democracy as a social form is somehow to blame for social
stratification or economic inequality. It is rather that the conditions under which democracy
is likely to emerge are conditions that tend to wed democracy to stratification and inequality
as the price of initial adoption, and thus constrain the scope for the operation of democratic
principles. The resulting absence of procedural equality might not be a problem in and off
itself,50 but in extremis it may have implications for the felt legitimacy of democratic orders.
There is one final way in which what happens at a democracy’s inception is necessarily
insufficient to ensure its sound working. It is easy to conceptualize democracy as being
adopted, or rejected, as a package, at a single moment of time. This is commonly how the U.S.
Founding is imagined, for instance. But there are necessary elements of a democracy that
cannot be adopted or embraced at a Founding moment. In particular, any choice of democratic
form requires the possibility of rotation out of office. Even on the minimalist account I have
stipulated, democracy is not compatible with an absence of uncertainty as to who will occupy
key public offices moving forward. But the possibility of rotation in public office requires trust
among office holders at the crucial moment when power is transferred. And trust is commonly
not created ex nihlio, or overnight. Trust must instead be learned; it is a habit, and as much
can be acquired only through repetition and experience.51 But at least the first (and perhaps
the second) time power must change hands, an immense amount of trust is needed—a trust
that cannot be predicated on past precedent, but that must often be spun from the gossamer
of a constitution’s paper promises, In at least one regard, therefore, a democracy will
necessarily be wanting at the moment of its creation—and thus susceptible to failure of one
sort or another—because it will want for the crucial element of trust that can be constructed
only over time.
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The possibility that these failures will overwhelm the operation of democracy’s three
essential institutional elements, and hence vitiate its claim to legitimate authority, is
unavoidable and pervasive. There is also a potential interaction here with the first
democracy/failure nexus: The perception that democratic procedures are stacked in favor of
elites may itself provoke a belief that extralegal violence is warranted as a means to alter unjust
distributions. The first and the second species of democratic failure limned here, in short, can
mutually reinforce each other in damaging ways.
Democracy as Failure 3: Democracy in Theory
The practice of democracy cannot be disentangled from certain theoretical
commitments. Democracy, that is, is not a game such as chess or Go, which is defined by a
closed set of rules enabling and inviting complex, strategic choices. Rather, from the basic
conceptual building blocks of popular choice, ex ante uncertainty, and institutional continuity
a wide range of different institutional arrangements can be imagined. There is no guarantee
that choices can be made between various potential arrangements without difficult sacrifices.
It is also possible that a normative question implicit in the design of democracy will have no
stable or satisfying answer. In these cases, it is plausible to talk of “failure” as a necessary, and
not merely contingent, feature of its instantiation.
This point requires some elaboration. We can usefully start with a canonical
formulation of democratic institutions in political thought supplied by Rousseau. The social
contract that Rousseau specifies is intended to reconcile two aims. It “defends and protects”
the “person and goods” of each member, even as it ensures that each “obeys only himself and
remains as free as before.”52 This tension between individual rationality and the collective
good, Rousseau suggests (rightly, I think), is implicit in democracy. It must be confronted
because democracy is among those forms of governments subject to a “basic legitimation
demand,” whereby “something must be said … in the mode of justifying explanation or
legitimation.”53 Rousseau’s solution is to place all persons and powers “under the supreme
direction of the general will,” with “each member as an indivisible part of the whole.”54 The
relation of private to general wills in Rousseau’s account is the crux of his mediation between
the two aims of the social control. As such, it has generated considerable interpretive division,
including debate on whether Rousseau was indeed “drawn to democracy.”55
What is relevant here is less whether it is accurate to characterize Rousseau’s solution
as democratic, and more whether he was able to identify any convincing justification for the
potential member of a polity concerned that about the private/general will trade-off. A broad
array of sensitive and careful scholars of Rousseau suggest not only that he failed to identify
such a justifying reconciliation, but that his work can be glossed as an ironic repudiation of
the very possibility of such a settlement. Hence, Bernard Williams denied the possibility of
“theoretical” resolutions to the competing moral demands of democracy, and instead
suggested that “Rousseau was right to impose impossible conditions.”56 Judith Shklar suggests
that his analyses are utopian, and as such “stand as reproaches to actuality.”57 In a rather less
charitable register, Sir Isaiah Berlin complains that “Rousseau mysteriously passes from the
notion of a group of individuals in voluntary free relations with each other … to the notion
of submission of something which is myself, and yet greater than myself.”58 That is, the twin
normative impulses that animate a seminal account of legitimate democratic rule are standardly
viewed as irreconcilable. Worse, Rousseau’s effort at rapprochement arguably catalyzed a new
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and volatile ideological amalgam in the shape of the general will. Even if some duller, sublunary
justification for democratic rule can be offered, as Bernard Williams intimated, it will fail to
navigate the theoretical impasse. It will leave a normative shortfall, or failure, as its residue.
Rousseau’s account of the social contract points toward a second obdurate theoretical
tension at the democratic project’s heart. He observes that a social contract must bind a
defined group of members, and as such requires some account of demographic boundaries.
On his account, the people are defined as such because they are “already bound by some union
of origin, interest, or convention,” even if they have not yet “borne the true yoke of laws.”59
Setting aside the question whether these prerequisites are ever plausibly satisfied—Rousseau
says they are, in Corsica—it is instead worth underscoring that no decisional procedure,
electoral, sortition-based, or representational, can get off the ground without an account of
boundaries. A tension arises between theoretical predicates of democracy in practice because
there is no good answer to the boundary problem, and the ways in which it is in practice solved
generally lack a sound footing in theory or empirical fact, even if its psychological pull is almost
irresistible. So Frederick Whelan’s complaint in these pages that democracy’s boundary
problem is “insoluble within the framework of democratic theory” still resounds today.60
Whelan’s conclusion resonates because the boundary problem’s theoretical
settlements are impractical, while the solutions observed in practice are hard to justify on any
normatively attractive basis. To begin with, it is a familiar observation that democratic
procedures cannot resolve the initial scope of a democratic policy, leaving what some call a
“paradox internal to democracies.”61 But if Rousseau’s intuition about the moral directives
animating the scope and formation of a democracy are to guide, a democratic polity should at
a minimum encompass all those whose “person” or “goods” materially affected by a polity’s
decisions. This raises both practical and theoretical difficulties. Many democratic decisions are
characterized by negative externalities, although their vector and scale will vary tremendously
from case to case.62 It is hard in practice to see how the demographic scope of a democracy
can be recalibrated for every decision a polity must take, depending on whether there are large
or small spillover costs. At the same time, a polity defined to account for all negative spillovers
would plainly exceed the criteria of “origin, interest, or convention” that Rousseau imposed.
Rather, embracing the logical entailment of Rousseau’s commitment would seem to require
that all those affected, and perhaps even all those potentially affected, by a polity’s decisions
should by rights have a share in that polity’s decision. The resulting “all affected interests”
principle, as Robert Goodin has demonstrated, conduces quickly to a global definition of the
polity. 63 But such a definition raises serious questions of “performative” feasibility as to
whether procedures exist, or can be imagined, for the aggregation, weighing, and enactment
of preferences within the polity. 64 Corsica and the globe, that is, present implementation
problems of such different magnitudes that it is reasonable to think that the design of
democracy for the latter is simply a distinct problem from the design of democracy for the
former.
Resisting the impulse toward globalism, David Miller has suggested ways to “radically
weaken the force” of an “all affected interests” principle. Miller’s strategy in part is to show
that the principle can be implemented only at the cost of compromising other morally relevant
considerations, since as the equality of individual interests. In part, it is to contend that the
principle simply lacks force. On this latter score, he makes three points. First, he has suggested
that the range of issues a democracy can address be constrained by ruling out ex ante decisions
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with large negative spillovers. Second, he suggests that a polity’s spillovers will vary in
magnitude, such that only some need be counted (although this point is pressed into service
of a different argument). Third, he suggests that the “all affected interests” principle only
applies to government decisions, and then only if someone has “no escape” from their negative
effects. 65 If these points are correct, the “all affected interests” principle can be honored
without serious damage to other normative compulsions.
I am not convinced, however, that Miller has identified ways in which the boundary
problem can be plausibly mitigated; rather, I think he shows why its resolution necessitates
trade-offs between the various moral predicates of democracy. Start with his first point.
Although Miller is correct that democratic procedures might place out of bounds decision
with large negative spillovers, the suggestion faces high practical hurdles. Contra Miller’s
recommendation, I am aware of no democratic constitution that creates zones of autonomy
for noncitizens instead of citizens. To the contrary, it is more common for citizens to benefit
from immunities from state action than noncitizens, even when the latter are resident
permanently within the polity. It is, moreover, hard to imagine a plausible set of democratic
preferences that would conduce to the arrangement Miller suggests—at least without some
substantial constraint of what democratic preferences can be realized.
Miller’s second basis for weakening the “all affected interests” principle—that some
effects are trivial—seems to me again practically difficult to implement. Many state policies
affect discrete tranches of nonresidents in predictable yet trenchant ways: Consider a state’s
decision to extend a domestic subsidy for a valued local crop or good (which is the economic
equivalent of imposing a tariff); its decision to bar some kind of family-based migration; or its
decision to support (or not to support) the development of a new pharmaceutical that will
mitigate a globally prevalent disease. All these decisions seem comfortably within the range of
plausible democratic discretion, yet all bear heavily on discrete yet distinct groups dispersed
variously around the world, perhaps in ex ante unpredictable ways. As these examples suggest,
his “no escape” limitation is of more theoretical than practical interest. To see this more
concretely, consider his suggestion that migrants are not “coerced” by border controls because
they can opt to settle in other countries.66 This might once have fitted the European context,
where (at least until recently) multiple options for migrants existed. But it ill describes the
plight of asylum seekers at the southern border of the United States. In any case, Miller does
not attend to the dynamic effect of his proposal—which again can now be glimpsed in the
growing pan-European resistance to accepting migrants—of interlocking barriers to entry for
migrants that leave then, in the aggregate, no humane, bearable option. Even accepting Miller’s
points, therefore, I think that considerable charge remains in the moral dilemmas of the
boundary problem.
The insolubility of the boundary problem means that there is always an open question
as to composition of the polity, and the nature of the bonds uniting its members—and this
openness increases the risk of democratic failure. In practice, the boundary problem is
putatively solved by an appeal to “some union of origin, interest, or convention.” But as
Joseph Schumpter observed, this imposes no tractable constraint on the definition of
democratic boundaries, such that a “race-conscious” or an “anti-feminist” nation present no
concerns of democratic legitimacy.67 Indeed, the many nations that define citizenships partially
in terms of the jus sanguinis principle—including putatively liberal states such as France and
Germany—and the long persistence of gender-discriminatory rules for derivative citizenship
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in U.S. law, suggest that Schumpeter’s solution is not outlandish, even as an account of practice
in supposedly liberal polities. The Schumpeterian solution to the boundary problem is also
consistent with practices of subnational authoritarianism—whereby racial or religious groups
within the geographic scope of the polity are excluded from the franchise, and thereby subject
to some form of permanent and deep social stratification—that otherwise would seem
inconsistent with democratic commitments. That is, an answer to the boundary problem that
sounds in “origin, interest, or convention” almost necessarily conduces to certain local failures
of democratic practice.
At the same time, as an empirical matter, biological or cultural grounds for democratic
self-definition, found with dismaying regularity in contemporary political discourse, are
unfaithful to historical fact and sociological realities. Race or ethnicity, to the extent they are
even stable, coherent categories,68 are not reliable proxies for criminality or expected economic
contribution.‡ As Samuel Scheffler has observed, efforts to define the polity in terms of culture
necessarily ignore or deny the fact that “culture and cultures are always in flux, and that
individuals normally relate to cultures through the acknowledgement of multiple affiliations
and activities.”69 With the possible exception of polities that rely on skill-based criteria for
immigration, such as Canada, the use of “origin, interest, or convention” in contemporary
national self-definition, current practice yields no morally compelling answer to democracy’s
boundary problem.
I will sketch quickly a third theoretical concern, although as an empirical matter, I think
its force is substantially less than the two I have aired already. Pace Rousseau’s image of the
general will as “always right” and as a justification for the extinguishing of all “partial society,”70
there is always be disagreement, always a dose of Madisonian faction, in a democratic society.71
The theoretical challenge that this creates is the familiar difficulty of aggregating a collective’s
interests in the face of Arrovian cycling. I am not sure this is a great challenge, despite the
hand-wringing it generates among public choice scholars. For one thing, in practice democratic
bodies prove remarkably adept at managing instability and reaching durable social choices.72
For another, the identification of a decision protocol wholly immune from potential cycling
may not be critical to democratic decision-making. Collective decisions can be legitimate
provided they are “accompanied by a justification for its choice in terms of the other
alternatives that could have been chosen and the principle that guided the choice.”73 The social
choice challenge to democracy, in short, is less substantial than first appears.
To summarize, I have focused on the way that questions implicit in the theory of
democracy—Rousseau’s challenge, the boundary problem, and Arrovian cycling—create
insuperable problems for the practice of democracy. In my view, it is the first two—and not the
cycling problem—that present the most intractable challenges because they tend to generate
local failures of democracy, such as subnational authoritarianism or illiberal or even racist
migration regimes. Their potential dissolving effect on democratic orders, however, go beyond
these local lapses: As the following section details, the intractability of these problems also
opens a space for political leaders and movements who oppose democracy as a going concern.
These deficiencies of theory, that is, can spawn practical failure in ways that I take up now.
There are many arguments for why race, ethnicity, and religion provide questionable grounds for resolving the
boundary problem, and I do not presume to exhaustively consider them here. Suffice to say that I view all such
resolutions as unavoidably suspect even if omnipresent.
‡
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Democracy as Failure 4: Democracy as its own gravedigger
I have so far delineated a series of practical and theoretical challenges that a democratic
polity cannot wholly avoid. I have suggested that these difficulties are irresolvable without
slighting valuable democratic goals. This implies that democracy falls short—it has retail
failures—at its origin and in its operation, and in its translation from theory to practice. All of
the limitations on democracy adumbrated thus far, however, have a local character: They
impugn one discrete dimension or feature of democracy’s operation. My final argument about
the entanglement of democracy and failure builds on these local failures, but goes beyond
them to posit a causal connection between local failures of democracy and its global, systemic
breakdown. Democracy, through its local failings, generates the psychological, institutional,
and political conditions in which the whole system of popular choice breaks down.
Democracy’s failures, as a result, are not importantly only because of their immediate effects
(although those can certainly be significant), but also because of their dynamic consequences
for systemic stability. Democracy, I thus contend, can become its own gravedigger.
To motivate this possibility, it is useful to start by reflecting on the ordinary operation
of an elective democracy. In most elections for national leaders, voters must choose between
one or more candidates. Outside a handful of exceptional cases, just less than fifty percent of
them will be immediately disappointed by the result. (In the 2018 Turkish elections, for
example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won just under 53 percent of the national vote, despite having
declared a state of emergency, purged the military and civilian bureaucracies, and inveigled
overwhelmingly positive coverage from state and private media). Once in office, moreover, a
leader is very likely to disappoint some, perhaps even all, of her supporters. Not all their
interests will be pursued with equal vigor; some of their hopes will inevitably be dashed. Few
of those who voted against her may be inclined to see her performance as a success. All this
means that in the ordinary case, many of the participants of an electoral democracy—perhaps
most—will experience an acute sense of disappointment, even dismay. Yet those participants
are expected, again and again, to find time in their hectic work and family lives to inform
themselves of the substance of a democratic choice, and then to take the time and effort—
some say irrationally—to express that choice.74 As a social practice with material costs at the
individual level, that is, democracy is not obviously self-sustaining.
It is not just the pure act of democratic selection that demands effort while supplying
scant psychological payoff. It is not at all clear that the policies or candidates chosen by a
democracy will be successful. As contemporary experience with climate change, pandemic
illness, and economic inequality show, democracies are not always good at recognizing serious
threats; they are often tardy in responding to them. And having worked up a response, a
democracy may infer that it has leeway to respond haphazardly to a crisis—inviting an even
more acute crisis down the road. In David Runciman’s account, “failure leads to success,
success leads to failure,” and all “moments of truth for democracy are an illusion.”75 The
difficulty of institutionalized learning on the part of elected bodies (as opposed to civil
services) seems to me of greater practical importance than the sempiternal debate as to
whether a democratic collective will make a wiser decision than an individual acting alone.76
At the level of policy, therefore, members of the voting public will often have good reason for
dissatisfaction with the democratic system.
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Discontent and dismay at both the personnel and the practical effects of democracy
can take different forms. One possibility is that participants will engage in what Pierre
Rosanvallon calls “counter-democratic” measures of surveillance, denunciation, and
oversight.77 Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, they can lapse into a general apathy and
disengagement from democratic processes from a sense that not only are their views and
actions causally irrelevant, but that ensconced leaders will typically home in on unjustified, and
even immoral, policies. When a democracy maintains authoritarian enclaves—the American
south until the 1960s; the female gender until the 1920s on both sides of the Atlantic—
emotional commitments to democracy are also likely to be overall thinner; to the extent that
enfranchised members of the system have a commitment in that system, it may be inextricably
connected to the maintenance of their own dominance. And obviously, those subject to
authoritarian practices are unlikely to have much faith in their polity’s democratic claims.
But this sort of general malaise in the face of democratic choice, and the concomitant
absence of any deep commitment to democracy as a going concern, presents a systemic threat
to democratic endurance. Since the 1930s, it has been abundantly clear that both political elites
and voting publics can bring to power candidates and movements that are systemically
opposed to the maintenance of democratic practice. 78 Although local discontents with
democratic performance are not the only cause of a more general democratic failure, it seems
very likely that the growth of such discontent makes it easier for an anti-system candidate or
party to seize power, and then dismantle democratic competition from within. In the 1990s,
Peter Mair offered precisely this diagnosis to explain the initial rise of anti-systemic populist
parties and candidates in Europe.79 Twenty years later, the patterns that Mair identified of low
voter turnout, high voter turnover, declining political party membership, and public
disengagement from politics have engendered a wave of populist chancers across Europe,
including Silvio Berlusconi, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, Beppo Grillo, and Norbert Hofer.80
A different kind of dysfunction can unfold in the legislative policy domain. Consider
in this regard an argument associated with the public choice theorist Mancur Olsen: 81
Democracy operates in time. Legislation produced at one point in time will persist, unless a
sunset clause has been included. Policies and institutions created by democratic processes,
moreover, often prove to be harder to dissolve than to create: Once created, policies create
pools of beneficiaries that will fight to maintain a legislative status quo. Separation of powers
systems, and even bicameralism in the absence of separated powers, creates multiple veto
gates, hence favoring a politics of such resistance.82 Over time, a sort of legislative calcification
occurs: As more and more law is added to the statute books—with each law being difficult to
undo—the burden of successive exercises of democratic choice drains surplus state capacity
to address new needs or previously excluded populations. Weighed down by the accumulating
baggage of electoral promises, a democracy over time becomes increasingly incapable of
responding to new challenges, or indeed, of even adapting to slowly shifting circumstances.
The arrow of legislative time, in this fashion, generates a congealing of policy commitments
that ultimately proves disabling.
A final dynamic operates through the causal channel of political structures, rather than
policies or voting practices. The nineteenth century English constitutional commentator
Walter Bagehot offered a justification for Victorian monarchy that has a bearing on the
stability of democratic rule today. According to Bagehot, a democracy will of necessity have
complex institutional arrangements as a means of accounting for the plurality of interests to
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be represented. (He might have added here that complexity flows in important part from the
hegemonic preservation strategies of existing elites and property holders documented above).
The opacity of the ensuing arrangements, however, undermines public understanding and
confidence in government. In Bagehot’s view, therefore, a simpler and less democratic
governmental form such as monarchy was necessarily more stable—and more publicly
satisfying—than a more complex one, such as democracy. Looking to the U.S. Constitution,
Bagehot condemned its want of any “ready, deciding power,” a dearth that left it incapable of
effectual response to the problems of post-Civil War Reconstruction. 83 In this way, Bagehot
thought, the very institutional design decisions intended to ensure the Constitution’s
ratification and survival paradoxically led to its downfall.
Not all of these arguments about the dynamic effect of retail democratic failure on the
risk of system failure should be given equal weight. Their force is an empirical, not a
theoretical, matter. At least as applied to the United States, I think Olsen’s and Bagehot’s
arguments have only limited force. I am not sure, though, whether those arguments would
have a more potent charge in different national contexts. Moreover, exogenous social and
economic forces—in particular the perception of rapid cultural change or economic
transformations that undermine the possibility of individual betterment—also contribute to
systemic crises of democracy.84 With all those caveats, I nonetheless think there is some reason
for concern that democracy’s various failures, even if initially local in scope, can over time
have destabilizing systemic implications. In a sense, this is simply a modern proof of Plato’s
dictum that democracy has inherent to it the tendency to degrade into tyranny (although
refashioned on empirical rather than metaphysical grounds).85 All show in different ways the
possibility that democracy can be its own gravedigger.
These three dynamics, moreover, interact with the theoretical failures that I have
sketched in the previous part. Recall that we have no satisfying account of how private wills
are fully identified with the general will, and we lack a solution to the boundary problem. This
means that democracy abides alongside a persisting uncertainty on matters key to its core
claims to legitimacy. As a result, the average participant in a democracy will never receive a
robust or even a clear statement of some basic terms of legitimation. However dimly aware
they are of the ensuing theoretical gap, they are vulnerable to appeals that exploit their regime’s
want of robust normative foundations. As a result, they may well be vulnerable to political
appeals that hinge on what Isaiah Berlin once called the “evil … mythology of the real self.”86
Appeals to ethnic or religious templates of nationhood can be invoked as justifications for
suppressing political opposition or disallowing the associational life that leads in time to
political opposition. Rousseau’s deeply misleading idea of a general will can be conjured to
justify measures that suppress channels for contesting and revising democratic judgments.
That this theoretical concern has some practical force is suggested by the fact that the
very fallacy Berlin decried turns out to be characteristic of the contemporary anti-democratic
populist wave. In an influential recent treatment, Jan-Werner Müller has defined populism as
a political strategy based on a “moralistic imagination of politics” as a Manichean
confrontation between a morally purified “people” and a corrupt and irremediable “elite.”87
Populism so defined can be observed as a hegemonic political formation in Latin American
(on the left), Europe, the United States, Israel, and India (on the right). A central conceptual
element of populism across these cases is the rhetorical elision of pluralism, which flows
seamlessly rather often into a dismantling of institutional checks on state power and a
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suppression of divergent opinions and associations.88 Populism as such need not always prove
an antechamber to autocracy.89 But it is a species of hegemony that easily and quickly bleeds
into a domination inconsistent with democratic persistence.90
Living With Democratic Failure
I have tried up to this point simply to capture a loosely affiliated array of connections
between the project of democracy and the prospect of its failure. To an extent that is not
recognized in the political philosophy work on democracy, I have argued, failure is not a risk
for the democracy project. It is a certainty. Both at its inception and in operation, as well as in
theory, democracy predictably and unavoidably falls short in many discrete ways. Given its
origins and the circumstances of its ongoing operation, several distinct kinds of failure will be
observed in a democratic system. The difficulty of avoiding these failures, at a bare minimum,
suggests a need to consider democracy through the lens of realist rather than ideal theory: The
latter runs the risk of specifying criteria of success that simply cannot be reached under any
plausible set of circumstances. An ideal theory lens, moreover, misses an important dynamic:
Retail disappointments can generate both a public psychology and a set of policy outcomes
that set the stage for more systemic breakdowns of democratic order. Theoretical failures open
the door to the political appeals of populists lacking a firm commitment to democracy. This
is not to say that the ordinary operation of democracy alone conduces to failure; it is rather to
suggest that this risk abides even in its otherwise mundane daily functioning.
All this should not be taken, however, as grounds for abandoning the ambition to
maintain democracy as a going concern. Rather, cognizance of the pervasiveness of failure can
provide a stimulus to fresh lines of theoretical inquiry and practical activity. I set forth below
practical lessons and theoretical entailments that might be drawn from the observation of
pervasive and at times concatenating democratic failure. These conclusions fall into three loose
categories. First, there is a relatively simple descriptive point about the identification problem
raised by the risk of systemic democratic failure. Second, a suite of lessons can be drawn about
particular elements of a public psychology well fitted to democracy given the predictable
frailties of democracy’s theoretical justifications. Finally, I consider implications of the
pervasiveness of democratic failure for key elements of constitutional design in a democracy.
The Identification Problem of Systemic Democratic Failure
If failure is embedded right at the origin of democracy, and if the project of
implementing democracy immediately confronts hard theoretical and practical limits, and if
those hard limits can cascade over time into a more systemic kind of failure, then it is far from
clear that any simple, crisp line can be drawn identifying ‘the’ point at which at which
democracy as a going concern has been compromised beyond repair. It is always possible to
point to some way in which democracy has failed. Many of those failures are, moreover,
absolute so far as the affected group is concerned. Subnational authoritarianism is an obvious
example. Moreover, there are no clear guidelines for predicting when a given cluster of
democratic failures will snowball into a more systemic breakdown. As a result, even as it will
almost always be possible to identify some failure, it will also be difficult to know whether there
is enough failure to imperil the structural persistence of democratic competition.
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This theoretical concern, which is immanent in the analysis so far, resonates with
recent empirical work on how democracies founder. In the past half century, the modality of
democracy failure has changed. Whereas once the modal form of democratic failure was the
military coup or the emergency declaration, now democracies fail by inches. They are corroded
from within by anti-systemic incumbents who employ constitutional and legal authorities to
undermine the institutional, legal, and social predicates for meaningful forms of democratic
contestation.91 Democratic failures latter now occur as incremental processes, sliced into small
pieces each of which may be superficially legal, with system-level effects emerging only
gradually over time.
The theoretical analysis of democracy as failure worked through here suggests that this
epistemic problem is even more acute than previously suggested. It also suggests that the
problem generalizes beyond those cases in which an anti-systemic candidate or party tries to
unravel democratic competition. In the absence of a complete and sudden caesura in
democracy’s functioning, taking the temperature of democratic health will always present a
considerable challenge. Consider again the crude litmus tests for democratic health that I
proffered at this essay’s outset: the existence of ex ante uncertainty about a selection
procedure’s outcome. The analysis so far suggests why various efforts to delineate ‘bright lines’
beyond which a democracy cannot tread without inviting a systemic collapse confront such
difficulties.92 In a context of pervasive democratic failure, discerning the critical step change
will often be well-nigh impossible.
Although the limited scope of my project here does not permit an extended an inquiry
into a substitute for bright lines, two potential alternatives merit notice here. First, it is possible
that rather than looking for discrete step changes to the quality of democracy, it is more
worthwhile to look for the direction of change. Democracy should be imagined as a systemlevel characteristic, akin perhaps to individual health, and gauged as such. We should focus on
whether its general state is improving or declining. Second, efforts to classify leaders and
parties in terms of their commitment to democracy as a system may be a better investment
than the search for an elusive bright line marking democratic failure. Although such
classifications are likely contentious, I suspect they are no less controversial than judgments
about the quality of democracy at large.
Democratic Failure and Errors of Political Psychology
Other distinctive lessons can be drawn from the mapping of democracy’s failures
about how democracy can be misconceived. I label these errors of ‘public psychology’ because
they are ways in which public, political discourse—rather than academic debate—goes awry.
Of course, there is no reason to anticipate that scholars would be immune from such mistakes;
indeed, to the extent scholars become Gramscian organic intellectuals for anti-systemic
populist movements, there is every reason to think that will indulge and even revel in
misapprehensions.
To begin with, the relation of democracy’s theoretical difficulties to the risk of populist
and anti-systemic destabilization explain the peril of what William Galston calls ‘antipluralism.’93 Democracy’s persistence is at risk, that is, when its leaders substitute what Arendt
called “the factual plurality of a nation or a people” with “the image of one supernatural body
driven by one superhuman, irresistible ‘general will.’”94 Arendt here is repudiating Rousseau’s
19
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3378117

account of the social contract. I think she is also repudiating the Hobbesian account of a
contract between individuals that gives rise to the delegation of sovereign power to a singular
levitation unbound by residual contractual bounds to a people. Further, I take her thought to
be inconsistent with the premise, common to both Rousseau and Hobbes—and recently
emphasized by Richard Tuck in his revisionist account of Hobbes as a proto-democrat in De
Cive—that “the people have no existence separate from the sovereign” and that the sovereign
relates to its constituent members solely as “individuals.” 95 All these positions, Arendt
suggests, are ersatz substitutes for “the lost sanction of religion” that once legitimated statebuilding projects.96 Of course, the appeal of such legitimating bromides runs deep. And it may
well be, at the end of the day, that the force of these corrosive denials of pluralism can be
extirpated from the public vocabulary of politics only by a thoroughgoing attack upon, and
repudiation of, the standard account of sovereignty.
Second, it follows from a pluralist orientation that the outputs of a democratic process
ought to be viewed with some caution. The project of democracy, that is, also requires that
one hold in mind constantly the contingency and partiality of any claim of representation or
judgment. Whatever the epistemic merits of democracy as a theoretical matter, there is
practical hazard in the presupposition that a democracy’s output are eo ipso correct as a factual
or moral matter. Perhaps they are more likely to be correct in some sense than say, decisions
by a single ruler or a narrow clique, 97 but that comparative advantage does not entitle
democratic outputs to any conclusive moral weight. Indeed, it ought to be a truism by now
that democratic decisions are often wrong on the facts and flawed on normative grounds.
Even if their finality must be conceded on pragmatic grounds, therefore, their moral heft
should be strictly construed.
Third, a related cognitive error concerns the possibility of a final, definitive response
to democracy’s boundary problem. For if it is a mistake to conjure some unitary popular
sovereignty, it is also problematic, and equally inconsistent with democracy as a political
project, to assume that the polity has crisp and clear boundaries. That claim is not just
empirically unsound—although one should not underestimate the profound and tendentious
fallaciousness tendered by way of sovereignty talk—it is also a theoretical error. The
boundaries of the polity are not settled once and for all, but are always up for renegotiation.
The denial of such fluidity is another sort of betrayal of the idea of democracy.
The history of repudiated franchise boundaries is a warning against confidence that
the final outer perimeter of enfranchisement has been reached. Many generations’ sturdy
beliefs in the good sense of excluding the poor, women, or racial minorities from the voting
booth now seem errant and apparent follies. The so-called “Great” Reform Act of 1832, for
example, excluded the working classes, who took to the streets as the Chartist movement to
demand a democratic voice. America’s Constitution, of course, endorsed and enabled the
exclusion of women and African-Americans—lacunae corrected only in 1919 and the 1960s
respectively. For the great part of American history, those exclusions seemed both obvious
and necessary. There is no reason to think that we are not making kindred errors today. Indeed,
the earlier noted tendency to gloss linguistically over the moral failings of the past by talking
of democracy as an American trait dating back to the eighteenth century suggests that we
remain prone to such errors. Our own beliefs about the mandatory reach of the franchise—
as well as our beliefs about the necessity and strength of migration controls—should be more
contingently, more modestly calibrated in light of that history, and in light of the constant
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possibility that our own secure normative coordinates will be disproved by fresh moral insight,
or by technological and social transformation.
Institutional Responses to Democratic Failure
An agenda for democracy-minded reform of constitutional and legal institutions would
be both expansive and necessarily tailored to the particular facts of the polity in question.98
The prevalence of local democratic failure, and its dynamic interaction with systemic collapses,
suggests a need for general prescriptions, though, that apply across heterogeneous national
contexts. Without being exhaustive—a task that would require consideration, inter alia, of
whether representative elections should be abandoned in favor of sortition; whether migration
policy requires first-order rethinking; and whether democratic capitalism is truly an oxymoron
at a moment of neoliberal triumph—I draw two generally applicable institutional responses to
democratic failure both from the above analysis and also my own prior work on the
constitutional design of democratic orders.
First, a sound democracy ought to have a way of identifying and learning from its
mistakes, and of correcting its shortfalls. Especially where a democratic failure leads to excision
or exclusion from collective decision-making, mechanism design presents serious challenges.
The population designated as salient for democratic ends always has an interest in patrolling
entry to the polity because new members necessarily dilute and diminish the voice of some
extant faction. Franchise expansion is therefore most likely when common cause can be
fashioned between democratic ‘insiders’ and those excluded from the polity. These alliances
will almost always face opposition. One way to anticipate and facilitate inclusionary alliances
is through the careful design of a constitutional amendment rule. In contemporary
constitutional practice, a wide variety of such rules can be observed, ranging from the
exceedingly obdurate to a near identity between legislative and constitutional changes. 99
Moreover, amendment rules can be de facto or de jure variegated, such that different kinds of
amendments must overcome varying procedural hurdles. 100 An amendment regime could
usefully accommodated the need for corrective expansions to the franchise by allowing them
to be passed by a less onerous rule than the mine rule of constitutional changes. It would thus
anticipate, and discount, inevitable endogenous opposition to such alternations motivated by
a fear of diluted voice.
Second, I have suggested that theoretical weaknesses pertaining to the basic terms of
democratic legitimacy open the door to populist and anti-systemic leaders. These leaders will,
as Ginsburg and I show elsewhere, endeavor to shut down the possibility conditions for
further democratic contestation. As a result, any democratic constitution should address
precisely and clearly the question of whether and how misconduct by elected leaders can be
sanctioned. (This sounds self-evident, but notice that the U.S. Constitution fails this simple
test). Different jurisdictions rely on a range of procedures, including votes of no confidence,
impeachment, anti-corruption commissions, and criminal prosecutions. I have argued that
illegality is often threaded into democracy’s origin, and also that the stable operation of a
democracy depends on compliance with the rule of law. There is often the template of original
legal defiance, as a result, to tempt a Jefferson into the Louisiana Purchase, a Lincoln into the
suspension of habeas corpus, or a Truman into the seizure of the nation’s steel mills. There is
always the possibility, that is, that illegality will succeed, and thereafter be embraced as the law
of the land. Indeed, this may well be a good characterization of how historical practice in the
21
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United States is folded into constitutional law.101 The allure of illegality—which is a species of
moral hazard—set aside the necessity of legality for durable democratic persistence, creates an
obvious tension that ought to be recognized and managed. At a minimum, such recognition
implies the wisdom of institutions that mitigate the moral hazard of redemptive illegalities. It
seems singular unwise to relegate that task to democratic majorities. After all, those majorities
have already by assumption made an erroneous choice of leaders already. Instead. a fulsome
recognition of democratic failure presses toward the need for politically independent
institutions, rooted in bureaucratic norms, for the investigation of high-level criminality and
malfeasance—institutions that even supposedly advanced democracies such as the United
States singularly lack.102
Conclusion
The central claim of this essay is that democratic practice involves plural failures of
different but concatenated kinds. Recognition of that fact, and a better understanding of the
specific manifestations of local failure as well as their causal relation to systemic breakdowns,
is missing from political philosophy writing on democracy. It is also, perhaps to more
substantial consequence, absent from the practice of institutional design and public
understandings within democracy. It is, I think, an unpleasant thing to acknowledge that the
lodestar of modern political life is doomed to fall short, time and again, for varying and
inevitable causes. Yet that recognition can profitably be integrated into an ethics of democracy,
one that is considerably more humble, cautious, and provisional than the triumphalism that
has characterized recent writing on the matter.
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